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REPLY BRIEF 
Come now the Appellants (hereinafter "Defendants") by and 
through counsel Thomas J. Scribner of fisher', Rcnbner., Moo 1; & 
Stir land, l1,, L ,
 r arid reply to Appellee's (hereinafter "Plaintiff") 
Brief of the Appellee. 
PACTS 
Defendants adopt and incorporate herein by reference the 
Statement of Facts set forth in their Brief of the Appellant. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE RECORD SHOWS THAT THE TRIAL COURT MISUNDERSTOOD THE 
ISSUES BEFORE IT AND THAT PLAINTIFF WAS NOT ENTITLED TO 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
N.iin! iff I'luii'ilil Mill a-iittnst I u • 1 f 'inl.tni • * 'i Defendants' 
alleged violation of an insurance agreement. Plaintiff's first 
summary judgment motion was denied. Subsequently, Plaintiff 
filed it" SPPOIIII mot inn tot -;ui . udgmen •••» subject oi; this 
appeal , which was based entirely - )efendants' alleged violation 
of another insurance agreement (the "Agreement")—an aqnvemcMit, 
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which was neither pled by nor referenced in Plaintiff's 
complaint. (R. at 5.) In fact, Plaintiff's second motion for 
summary judgment was Plaintiff's first assertion or reference of 
an kind that Defendants were allegedly liable for breach of the 
Agreement. The trial court's summary judgment decision granted 
judgment to Plaintiff on an agreement upon which Plaintiff had 
not sought relief in its Complaint and which was improperly 
before the trial court. 
A. Plaintiff's failure to plead the Agreement in its 
Complaint prevented Defendants from asserting the 
legitimate Statute of Limitations defense. 
Defendants' first notice that Plaintiff sought recovery on 
the Agreement was when Plaintiff filed its second motion for 
summary judgment on December 11, 1991. (R. at 382.) The 
Agreement was cancelled by Plaintiff and effective February 6, 
1985. (R. at 255.) Plaintiff's second motion for summary 
judgment was brought after expiration of the Statute of 
Limitations for contract actions set forth in UCA 78-12-23. 
Because Defendants' liability on the Agreement was not pled in 
Plaintiff's complaint and Defendants had no notice of Plaintiff's 
cause of action, Defendants never had the opportunity to raise 
the Statute of Limitations defense in the lower court. 
The Statute of Limitations defense is an affirmative defense 
set forth in Rule 8 (c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and 
is affirmatively pled in an answer. (See URCP Rule 12 (h), Staker 
v. Huntington Cleveland Irr. Co., 664 P.2d 1188 (Utah 1983), 
American Coal Co. v. Sandstrom. 689 P.2d 1 (Utah 1984).) 
Defendants could not assert the Statute of Limitations defense it 
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their answer because Plaintiff's had not sought relief on the 
Agreement in Plaintiff's complaint. 
Although Rule 12 allows certain affirmative defenses to be 
raised by motion, the Statute of Limitations defense is not one 
of them. URCP Rule 12 (b) and (h). Therefore, Defendants had no 
vehicle by which to plead the Statute of Limitations defense—it 
could not be raised by motion and Plaintiff's complaint did not 
include the Agreement as a cause of action. 
Plaintiff attempts to argue that "notice pleading," as set 
forth in Rule 8 (a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, somehow 
permits Plaintiff to obtain summary judgment relief under the 
Agreement—which had not been not pled by Plaintiff and which was 
not before the trial court. (See Brief of Appellee P. 10.) 
Accepting Plaintiff's argument denies Defendants substantial 
rights and legitimate defenses and allows Plaintiff to file its 
complaint based on one agreement and obtain summary judgment on 
an entirely different agreement simply by asserting that 
Defendants somehow should have had notice that Plaintiff would 
seek relief based upon Defendants' alleged breach of an agreement 
which was not pled in the Complaint. 
If Plaintiff believed that it had a valid claim based on the 
Agreement, Plaintiff should have amended it complaint to assert 
the related cause of action—not raise it for the first time in a 
motion for summary judgment. An amended complaint would then 
appropriately allow Defendants to assert their defenses, 
including the defense that Plaintiff's cause of action on the 
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Agreement was barred by the Statute of Limitations. 
Significantly, "notice pleading" cannot be used to 
legitimize claims which were not claimed in Plaintiff's 
complaint. (See Ellis v. Hale, 373 P.2d 382 (Utah 1962).) 
In Ellis the court addressed a claim that of a breach of a title 
insurance policy. With respect to that claim the court stated: 
"The policy is not contained in the record before us, and the 
particular provision or provisions claimed to have been breached 
are not set out in the complaint. The claim does not meet the 
requirements of our rules and was properly dismissed." (Ellis, 
at 385-386, emphasis added.) 
The situation in the case at bar is similar, except that the 
trial court granted summary judgment on Plaintiff's unpled claim. 
When Defendants attempted to point this problem out to the trial 
court, Defendants' arguments were ignored. (R. at 514-519.) 
In National Farmers Union Prop, and Cas. Co. v. Thompson, 
286 P.2d 249, 253 (Utah 1955), the Utah Supreme Court Stated: 
Notwithstanding all of our efforts to eliminate 
technicalities and liberalize procedure, we must not 
lose sight of the cardinal principle that under our 
system of justice, if an issue is to be tried and a 
party's rights concluded with respect thereto, he must 
have notice thereof and an opportunity to meet it. 
Emphasis added. Notice pleading cannot legitimize a claim that 
the Defendants have not had any opportunity to meet. 
B. The record requires that Plaintiff's summary judgment 
be reversed. 
Plaintiff's complaint clearly pleads a cause of action for 
premiums earned from December 27, 1984 to April 30, 1985. The 
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complaint refers to a policy that was cancelled due to non-
payment of premiums. (R. at 5.) Defendants received a notice of 
cancellation dated January 22, 1985 indicating that their policy 
was cancelled because they were not eligible and advising them to 
obtain coverage elsewhere. Interestingly, although Plaintiff's 
cancellation notice to Defendants contains a space where either a 
refund or deficiency is to be noted, none was noted. (R at 255.) 
The first time Plaintiff claims that it is due additional 
premiums from Defendants under the Agreement discussed above is 
in Plaintiff's second motion summary judgment filed by Plaintiff 
over six years later. (R at 382.) The record cannot support 
summary judgment on a claim that was never pled by Plaintiff. 
Plaintiff argues that it "undercharged" Defendants and that 
the rates Plaintiff had to charge for the sixty nine days 
coverage which were provided to Plaintiff prior to the 
cancellation notice were set by state law and could not be 
varied. Plaintiff's argument absurdly places the responsibility 
on Defendants to ensure that Plaintiff's rates are correct and 
ignores both the principles of agency law as set forth in 
Defendants' appellate brief, (Brief of Appellant pgs. 13-17) and 
the stated purposes of the Insurance Code, Utah Code Annotated 
section 31-18-1(2): "The purposes of this chapter are: a. To 
protect policy holders and the public against the adverse effects 
of excessive, inadequate and discriminatory rates; . . . ." 
Plaintiff's argument, which effectively raises unilaterally the 
estimated and quoted rates to Defendants by over 60%, violates 
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such purposes. 
Further, the trial court's judgment evidences the court's 
misunderstanding and that it based its decision on Plaintiff's 
first motion for summary judgment and not Plaintiff's second 
motion—the only motion before the trial court. The trial court 
found that subsequent to the notice of cancellation Defendants 
were notified by Plaintiff that they were not eligible for 
preferred rates but that they could be insured under a higher 
rate by an affiliate company and that a policy was later issued 
by that affiliate company. (R. at 512.) 
The court's language directly paraphrases language contained 
in a letter from Plaintiff to Defendants which was part of 
Plaintiff's first motion for summary judgment but which was not 
part of Plaintiff's second motion. However, the court's finding 
is contradicted by the notice of cancellation, (R. at 255), 
which was received over a month before the letter paraphrased by 
the Court in its ruling. (R. at 255, 256.) The letter referred 
and paraphrased by the Court dealt with an insurance policy which 
was not the subject of Plaintiff's second motion for summary 
judgment. This is further demonstrated by the fact that the 
amount awarded in the court's ruling (prior to the judgment 
prepared by Plaintiff and upon which Plaintiff's judgment was to 
be based) mirrored the complaint rather than Plaintiff's second 
motion for summary judgment. 
It is easy to understand how the Court could make this 
error. The Court assumed it was ruling on a cause of action 
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which had been pled in Plaintiff's complaint, rather than on a 
cause of action raised for the first time by Plaintiff in its 
second motion for summary judgment. 
C The trial court's summary judgment awarded Plaintiff an 
amount different than that Plaintiff requested in its 
motion—evidencing the court's misunderstanding. 
Plaintiff argues correctly in its brief that the trial court 
has the authority to correct clerical errors in judgments 
pursuant to Rule 60 (a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
However, Rule 60 (a) assumes that the error is clerical and not a 
misunderstanding of what is before the court. 
After the trial court issued its first ruling on Plaintiff's 
second motion for suitanary judgment, Defendants submitted a motion 
for new trial arguing that the amount of the award was wrong—the 
amount awarded corresponded to the amount Plaintiff had sought in 
its first motion for summary judgment and was in significant 
excess of what Plaintiff's had requested in their second motion 
for summary judgment. (R. at 516, 517.) Although, Plaintiff 
stated in its response that the error could be corrected, the 
trial court's response was to ignore both sides and caused the 
incorrect judgment to be entered. (R. at 527, 541.) 
Plaintiff then submitted a proposed judgment reflecting what 
Plaintiff had sought for in its second motion for summary 
judgment and not what the trial court had awarded. (R. at 542.) 
Defendants objected since the judgment did not correspond with 
the trial court's ruling. (R. at 551-553.) The Court then 
entered summary judgment against Defendants for the amount set 
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forth in Plaintiff's proposed judgment which judgment was 
significantly different the trial court's ruling. (R. at 546.) 
Although the court issued a brief memorandum, it did not 
reconcile the differences in the language and award between its 
preliminary ruling and the judgment prepared by Plaintiff, nor 
did the court address Defendants' claims that Plaintiff's 
judgment was granted on a matter which was not before the court 
and which had not been pled by Plaintiff. (R. at 556.) 
The fact that the trial court reviewed this matter three 
times without addressing any of the parties' concerns 
demonstrates that the court did not understand the issues which 
were before it. The court further failed to reconcile the 
differences between the amount of the judgment it signed and the 
court's preliminary ruling despite numerous opportunities to do 
so. 
II. THE ESTIMATED RATES QUOTED TO DEFENDANTS
 # PAID BY 
DEFENDANTS# AND SET FORTH IN PLAINTIFF'S PREMATIC FINANCING 
AGREEMENT ARE BINDING ON THE PLAINTIFF. 
Plaintiff argues that the rates for insurance set forth in 
the Prematic Financing Agreement which Plaintiff quoted to 
Defendants and which were paid by Defendants should somehow be 
ignored. (Brief of Appellee p. 21.) Rather, Plaintiff urges the 
Court to adopt statutory rates calculated over six years later. 
Plaintiff claims that the estimate is somehow not binding on it— 
violating both the principles of agency law and the terms of the 
Prematic agreement. 
3 Am. Jur.2d Agency section 273 (1986) states that w[i]f an 
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act done by an agent is within the apparent scope of authority 
with which he has been clothed, it does not matter that it is 
directly contrary to the instructions of the principal. The 
principal will, nevertheless, be liable. . . . " Plaintiff's 
agent calculated the annual premium and did not notify the 
Defendants of any changes within 30 days as required by the 
Prematic application and agreement. 
Plaintiff argues that the Court should ignore the final 
clause of the Prematic agreement which states: "If rejection of 
application is not received by customer within 30 days after 
date, acceptance is presumed." (R. at 248.) However, Plaintiff 
argues that the applicable rates should be rates calculated some 
six years later rather than the rates of the Prematic agreement. 
Plaintiff's argument is nonsensical since some 60 days into the 
period for which Defendants were attempting to obtain insurance, 
Plaintiff notified Defendants that their insurance was cancelled. 
Further, the notice was void of any request for additional 
premiums. (R. at 255.) 
Yet, while Plaintiff asks the Court to ignore the rates 
paragraphs of the Prematic agreement, Plaintiff does request the 
Court to enforce paragraph 4 of the same agreement which 
authorizes changes in the monthly payment: "in the event of 
changes of coverage or rates ordered by either the customer or 
the insurance company." Plaintiff's reliance on this provision 
is misplaced. Plaintiff cannot argue that this provision permits 
Plaintiff to charge Defendants a rate higher than set forth in 
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the Prematic agreement because Plaintiff does not argue that a 
"change of coverage or rates," or required by the Prematic 
agreement, ever occurred between November 30, 1984 and February 
6, 1985. 
Plaintiff's argument is that its agent miscalculated the 
rate and that it was actually higher to begin with. To argue 
otherwise would require that the Court ignore the fact that this 
was a new application. There had been no prior premiums from 
which an adjustment could be made. This clause in the agreement 
was intended to provide flexibility over the course of the 
contractual relationship of the parties. It was not intended to 
allow Plaintiff to adjust the estimates of its agents by any 
amount it wishes. 
In light of the fact that the case at bar does not involve a 
"change of coverage or rates#" Plaintiff's claim that Allston 
Finance Co. v. Hanover Insurance Co.. 463 N.E. 2d 562 (Mass. App. 
1984) supports its position is mistaken. Allston, would only 
apply if there were a change in the charges by the insurance 
carrier. An error by an agent is very different from a change in 
rates. 
III. THE ISSUE OF TIMELINESS OP PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM FOR $367.21 WAS 
PRESERVED BELOW AND IS PROPERLY BEFORE THE COURT. 
Defendants, in their Memorandum in Support of Motion for New 
Trial and Request for Oral Argument, raise the propriety of 
Plaintiff's claim for $367.21. Defendants' memorandum states in 
relevant part: 
It is important to remember that plaintiff did not 
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bring a cause of action based on the first insurance 
application; rather, plaintiff's cause of action began 
based on the second insurance application, which the 
Olcotts neither signed nor had any knowledge of. 
Despite the fact that plaintiff did not sue on the 
first insurance application (in fact, plaintiff has 
never asked the Olcotts to pay the $367.39 plaintiff 
claims is due under the first application), it filed a 
motion for summary judgment based on that application. 
(R. at 514-519.) 
Defendants' appellate memorandum provided the only 
opportunity Defendants have had to contest the propriety and 
timeliness of Plaintiff's summary judgment claim which Plaintiff 
has never pled. As set forth above, there was never an 
opportunity to address the timeliness of Plaintiff's summary 
judgment claim based on the Statute of Limitations because that 
defense must be asserted affirmatively in an answer. Defendants 
were denied the opportunity to answer and defend against 
Plaintiff's claim alleged in its second motion for summary 
judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
The Summary Judgment granted by the trial court should be 
reversed and remanded because it deals with issues which were not 
properly pled, and were therefore never before the court, as well 
as because genuine issues of material fact exist. 
Dated this 3rd Day of November, 1993, 
THPMA 
^ttor 
^p S J. 
:t ney /f 
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